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        <title>pessoais:pedro:definicoes</title>
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        <description>Equilibrium

Equilibrium

An n-tuple [...] such that each player's mixed strategy maximizes his payoff if the strategies of the others are 
held fixed. Thus each player's strategy is optimal against those of the others.&quot;

Nash Equilibrium (NE) must exist for all finite games with any number of players. Until Nash, this had only been proved for 2-player zero-sum games by von Neumann and Morgestern.</description>
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        <description>Assuntos

Assuntos

spatial equilibrium models
ricardian equivalence (&quot;tax now&quot; or &quot;tax later&quot;)

Papers

Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University.</description>
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